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JENKINS, THE PUBLIC CONCERN TEST,
AND THE NEED FOR LIMITING
PRINCIPLES IN PRIVATE CITIZEN
RETALIATION CLAIMS
LAURA MARINO'
"RETALIATION,

n.

The natural rock upon which is reared the

Temple of Law."1

INTRODUCTION

A.

FirstAmendment Retaliation Claims

A retaliation claim is an inherently unique cause of action
that arises when an individual engages in constitutionally
protected speech and is, as a result, retaliated against by a
government entity or actor.2 Unlike typical First Amendment
claims, retaliation claims do not involve the direct prohibition of
speech, but rather are constitutional violations which "may arise
from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the
exercise of First Amendment rights."3 As a result of their
indirect nature, retaliation claims must be alleged under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires that the plaintiff show a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right by a person
acting "under the color of state law."4 This type of claim was first
recognized in the public employment context and was used as a
means to protect government employees from being demoted or
Associate Managing Editor, St. Johns Lau Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Providence College.
AMBROSE BIERE, THE DEVIL'S Di TIONARY 153 (NuVision Publications 2007)

(1881).
See Jenkins v. 1d. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affld in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580 (6th
Cir. 2008).
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
See Jenkins, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
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discharged as a result of exercising their fundamental right of
free speech by criticizing their government employers.5
Recognizing that the government also has a great interest in
maintaining control over its employees and its workplaces, courts
began utilizing the public concern test to limit the types of claims
that could be brought. Under the public concern test, employees'
speech is protected only if it relates to a matter of public concern,
meaning that it must relate to a matter of "political, social, or
other concern of the community, rather than merely a personal
grievance."6
Retaliation claims eventually became an attractive
alternative for private individuals seeking redress for only an
indirect violation of their First Amendment rights.7 As a result,
courts have been faced with the problem of determining the
proper standard to apply to private citizens bringing what has
historically been a cause of action reserved for public employees.
Recently, in Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local School District, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
public concern test does not apply to private citizen retaliation
suits.' The court held that the plaintiff, speaking as a private
citizen, would be protected even if the speech did not relate
to a matter of public concern.9
In eliminating the public
concern test for private individuals-the cause of action's major
limiting principle-the Jenkins Court opened the door to an
overwhelming increase in retaliation claim litigation, creating an
entirely new problem to be faced by future courts dealing with
private citizen First Amendment retaliation claims.
B.

The Jenkins Decision

During the 2000-2001 school year, Shanell Ratcliff was a
second-grade student in the Rock Hill School District ("Rock Hill"
or "the School"). 10 Shanell, who was diagnosed with Type I
diabetes in March of 2000, needed Rock Hill employees to aid in

See Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
6 Mnyofu v. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-C-8717, 2005 WL 2978735, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
1, 2005).
7 See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 587.
See id. at 586-87.
9 See id. at 588-89.
"oId. at 583-84.
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her diabetes management during the school day. 1 To authorize
the School's involvement, Shanell's mother Shara Jenkins
and Shanell's doctor were required to sign "Administration of
Medication" forms. 12 These forms gave Rock Hill employees
permission to administer a glucogen shot but only in the extreme
and unlikely event of Shanell losing consciousness.13 Under less
serious circumstances, the Administration of Medication forms
authorized Rock Hill only to contact Jenkins so that she could
personally administer an insulin shot to her daughter.14
A conflict soon arose between Jenkins and Rock Hill's
nurse Marsha Wagner regarding who was responsible for
administering Shanell's shots.15 Jenkins argued that, to prevent
her from having to go to her daughter's school herself, Wagner
should be responsible for giving the insulin shots when
Shanell's blood sugar tested above 250.16 Wagner maintained
that she would need formal authorization to comply with
Jenkins's wishes; however, Jenkins refused to fill out another
authorization form detailing the new instructions. 7 Instead,
Jenkins approached Rock Hill's superintendent Lloyd Evans and
complained that the School would not administer Shanell's
shots.' 8 Evans allegedly responded that Rock Hill was not
responsible for her medical care and told Jenkins that Shanell
could not come back to school.19 Shanell had to miss seven days

" See Jenkins v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub noin. Jenkins. v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580 (6th
Cir. 2008).
12 Id.
13 See id. at 751.
14 See id. The Administration of Medication forms for the preceding school year
had authorized a slightly different course of action. See id. According to those forms,
Rock Hill was authorized to give Shanell orange juice and contact her mother if her
glucose levels tested below seventy. Id. at 750. If Shanell's glucose tested above two

hundred, Rock Hill was to give her water and contact Jenkins. Id. Lastly, as was
agreed during the 2001-2002 school year, the School was authorized to administer a
glucogen shot only if Shanell lost consciousness. Id. at 750-51.
1 See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 584.

16 See Jenkins, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 751.

See id. Jenkins claims that she did not fill out the forms to give Rock Hill
permission to administer the insulin shots because she "couldn't write something
down that they refused to do." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
17

16

See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 584.

a See id.
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of school, during which Jenkins contacted the United States
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights and the Ohio
Department of Education to have Shanell readmitted.2 °
The day after Shanell's return to Rock Hill, Jenkins was
prohibited from going to her daughter's classroom without first
signing in at the office.2 1 Jenkins met with Evans to complain
about this treatment and about the School's refusal to administer
her daughter's medication-irrespective of her own refusal to
At this meeting, Evans
sign a new authorization form."
threatened to call the Lawrence County Department of Job and
Family Services ("Child Services").
About one week after the meeting, Jenkins filed a complaint
with the United States Department of Education.2 4 She also
wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper complaining
about Rock Hill's response to her complaints and her daughter's
illness:
I have a 7-year-old daughter who is diabetic and has attended
Rock Hill No. 2 school for three years. I received a phone call
from the superintendent Nov. 27 and was told I couldn't bring
my daughter back to school. I was told she wasn't enrolled
there anymore.
The school took it upon themselves to withdraw her without
my permission and said that I was the one who withdrew her.
We tried going to the school and got escorted out by a teacher. I
made contacts with the state and got her back in school after

she missed seven days.
Now, we are being treated differently, just because I'm fighting
for my daughter's rights. There's only one teacher in the school
willing to take responsibility for my daughter's health issues.
This goes to show you how much "teachers" care about your
children.

2

5

Six days after the letter's publication, an anonymous caller,
calling from Rock Hill's principal's office,26 made a complaint to
Child Services, initiating an investigation into whether Jenkins
20 See id.
21 See id.
22

See id.

See id. Jenkins claims that at this point, Evans told her, "'you contacted the
Office of Civil Rights and got an investigation started, so I figured I'd start one of my
own.' "Id.
23

"4See id.

25

Id.

2 See id.
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Child Services filed its own
was medically neglecting Shanell
complaint against Jenkins in the Lawrence County Court of
Common Pleas the following January, but the case was dropped
four months later.28
Subsequently, Jenkins initiated her retaliation claim
alleging a violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 To
establish a § 1983 violation, a plaintiff "'must identify a right
secured by the United States Constitution and deprivation of
that right by a person acting under color of state law.' "30 Here,
Jenkins alleged that Rock Hill retaliated against her by
contacting Child Services in response to her writing the letter to
the newspaper and exercising her First Amendment rights.3 1
The district court granted Rock Hill's motion for summary
judgment and reasoned that to make out a First Amendment
retaliation claim, Jenkins's speech had to relate to a matter of
public concern.3 2 The court found that Jenkins's speech "fail[ed]
as a matter of law to relate to a matter of public concern" because
her comments concerned her own personal grievances and did
not address the situation of other students.3 3 Therefore, the
district court held that her First Amendment retaliation claim
must necessarily fail.34
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that, while the public
concern test is the appropriate standard to apply in retaliation
claims brought by public employees, the district court erred in
adopting the public concern test for retaliation claims brought by
private individuals like Jenkins.3 5 In coming to this conclusion,
the Jenkins Court recounted the three elements of a retaliation
claim:

27 See Jenkins v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affld in

part, rev'd in part sub nor. Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580 (6th
Cir. 2008).
2 See id.
29 Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 585.
30Jenkins, 463 F. Supp.2d at 755 (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d

1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992)).
"' See id. at 756-57.
32See id. at 757.
33 Id.

See id.

: See Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 583, 587 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing Gable v. Lewis, 201 F.3d 769, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 128

S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
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(1) the plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected
activity;
(2) the defendant's adverse action caused the plaintiff to suffer
an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness
from continuing to engage in that activity; and
(3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part as 36a
response to the exercise of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
If these elements are satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant who then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the
same allegedly retaliatory actions would have been taken even in
the absence of the constitutionally protected activity. 7
First, the Sixth Circuit determined that Jenkins was
engaged in a constitutionally protected activity. 3' The court
reasoned that speech is generally protected under the First
Amendment, with only a few limitations.3 9 While the public
concern test imposes a limitation on the free speech of public
employees, the court held that it should not similarly limit the
speech of private individuals." Adoption of the public concern
test was intended to ensure that public employees, who enjoy
slightly less encompassing rights than private individuals, would
be free to speak out on matters of public concern without fear
of retaliation by their government employers.4 1 Unlike the rights
of public employees, private individuals' rights are not abridged
by the government's interest in controlling its workforce.
Therefore, the court found that a private citizen's right to
criticize a public official or a government entity falls clearly
within the Constitution's protection, thus satisfying the first
element.4 2
As articulated by the Jenkins Court, the second and third
elements require a showing that the defendant's action caused an
injury that would likely "chill a person of ordinary firmness" from
43
continuing to engage in the constitutionally protected activity
and that the defendant's action was "motivated at least in part
as a response to the exercise of the plaintiffs constitutional

" Id. at 585-86 (citing Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
17 See id. at 586.
3 See id. at 588.
See id.
40 See id.

4ISee Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588.
43See id. at 585-86.
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rights."4 4 Though these elements were never reached by the
district court, the Sixth Circuit held that Jenkins satisfied
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that having a false
them.4 5
claim made with Child Services and having one's daughter
dismissed from school were sufficient to "chill a person of
ordinary firmness" from continuing his or her protected speech.46
Also, the court found that Evans's alleged admission that he was
going to call Child Services was sufficient to prove the causal
connection required by the third element.4 7 Therefore, the court
held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
to Rock Hill.48
This Comment's Ambitions

C.

This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit properly
concluded that the public concern test should not be applied to
private individuals in the context of First Amendment retaliation
It takes issue, however, with the Sixth Circuit's
claims.
reasoning, as well as the lack of attention given to the policy
considerations raised in the district court and in other recent
cases. Part I examines the origins of retaliation claims and the
public concern test. Part II discusses extensions of the public
concern test outside of the public employment context and the
merit of the Jenkins decision to not extend it even further to
apply to private individuals. Finally, Part III scrutinizes the
Sixth Circuit's failure to examine the policy considerations
implicated by its decision, namely, the overwhelming increase
in litigation that may result due to the cause of action's
undemanding causal standard and the elimination of its major
limiting principle.

Id. at 586 (citing Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
See id. at 588.

4 Id. at 588-89.
17

48

See id. at 589.
Id.
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ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC CONCERN TEST AND RETALIATION
CLAIMS

Limitations on the Rights of the Public Employee

"'A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.' 41
This classic Justice Holmes quote epitomizes the prevailing
view of the First Amendment rights of public employees
throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.5"
Throughout that time, courts held that public
employees surrendered their fundamental rights upon entering
government employment. 1 Working for the government was
subject to conditional limitations, and those who accepted
employment were precluded from challenging them.52 The tide
began to change, however, toward the middle of the twentieth
century.
With the onset of the Cold War and McCarthyism, the
Supreme Court was confronted with increasingly suspect
demands by public employers, requiring their potential
employees "to swear oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the
4
53
groups with which they associated." In Wieman v. Updegraff,1
the Court considered the constitutional rights of public
employees who violated a state law by refusing to take an oath of
loyalty within thirty days of its establishment.5 5 A taxpayer
sought to enjoin the government from paying salaries to the
employees who had refused to take the oath and succeeded in
doing so at the state court level. 6 The Supreme Court reversed,
however, holding that the oath was unconstitutional because it
amounted to the government's "assertion of arbitrary power" and
" Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)).
" See id.
51 See id.
5' See id. at 143; see also McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518 ("The servant cannot
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him .... [Tihe
city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.").
" Connick, 461 U.S. at 144.
5 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
55 See id. at 185. The employees were faculty and staff members at Oklahoma
Agricultural Mechanical College. Id. Teachers were often targeted by legislation
requiring employees to swear similar oaths of loyalty. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at
144.
5 See Wieman, 344 U.S. at 185-86.
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resulted in a violation of the employees's rights.57 Breaking with
the traditional notion that public employees surrender their
rights upon accepting government employment, the Court
reasoned that employees retain their constitutional rights
and suggested that these rights must be balanced against the
government's interests.58
The Court recognized that the
government has a great interest in protecting national security
but stated that "it must do so without infringing the freedom[]" of
its employees and its citizens.5 9
B.

Pickering and the Public Concern Test

The need to balance the rights of public employees with the
rights of their government employers was expressly recognized
by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education."
There, Pickering was dismissed from his teaching job for
exercising his First Amendment right to free speech by sending a
letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of Education for
its methods of raising revenue and its appropriation of funds.6 1
The Board of Education argued that this kind of speech was
"detrimental" to the school's ability to operate efficiently62 and
that the letter, which came from one of the school district's own
employees, "would be disruptive of faculty discipline, and would
tend to foment 'controversy, conflict and dissention' among
teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, and the
residents of the district."63 Siding with the Board of Education,
the state courts held that Pickering's acceptance of a teaching
position obligated him to abstain from speaking in ways that
otherwise would have been constitutionally protected were he not
employed by the government.6 4 The Supreme Court could not
agree.

"' See id. at 191-92.
8 See id. at 188.
59 Id.

60 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
61 See id. at 564. Specifically,

Pickering argued that too much money was being

spent on athletics and not enough on education and that the district had previously
tried to keep disapproving teachers quiet to prevent them from openly criticizing the
school. See id. at 566.
62 See id. at 564.
O Id. at 567.
64 See id. The state court also noted that, due to his employment with the
government, Pickering had a "duty of loyalty to support his superiors." Id. at 568.
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Though the Court recognized the government's interest in
maintaining an efficient and disciplined workplace, it also
recognized the right of public employees, speaking as citizens, to
engage in free speech.6 5 To balance these interests, the Court
established what has come to be known as the public concern
test. Under this test, public employees are free to speak out as
provided that the
citizens on matters of public concern,
interests of the government employer do not outweigh the public
The Court reasoned that
employee's constitutional rights.6 '
speech regarding a matter of public concern should be
protected-even in the employment context-since unhindered
debate on matters of public concern is "the core value of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 6' 8 Because debate on
public issues is so "vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate," and because public employees will likely be informed
regarding matters of public concern, the Court determined that
government employees play an important role in public debate,
and thus should not be precluded from participating simply
because of their government employee status.6 9 The Court's
decision expanded the rights of public employees by recognizing
the right of employees to speak on matters of public concern, as
well as the need to balance governmental and individual
interests.7 °
The public concern test and Pickering's reasoning were
upheld in Connick v. Myers, 7 in which the Court noted that
" See id. at 568.
66 Matters of public concern are those that "relate to a matter of political, social,
or other concern of the community, rather than merely a personal grievance."
Mnyofu v. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-C-8717, 2005 WL 2978735, at *5 (N.D. 111.Nov. 1,
2005).
17 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. The corollary to this is, of course, that public
employees' speech that is not of public concern is not protected.
"' Id.; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.").
69 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
71See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).
71 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick involved a government employee, Sheila Myers,
who claimed that she was terminated due to her outspoken refusal to accept a
transfer and because she created a questionnaire that circulated around the
workplace, soliciting fellow public employees' concerns about the office. See id. at
140-41. Though it was ultimately determined that Myers's speech was not
protected, the Court used Pickering's rationale and balanced Myers's interest in
exercising her First Amendment rights with the interests of the government in
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Pickering's repeated emphasis that an employee's right to speak
on matters of public concern should not be ignored. 2 Connick
observed that Pickering's recognition of the right of public
employees to speak on matters of public concern has been
"reiterated in all of Pickering's progeny, reflect[ing] both the
historical evolvement of the rights of public employees, and the
common sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter."7 3
Though there has been slight variation in the standard
throughout the years, Pickering is still relied upon by courts
when determining the outcome of First Amendment retaliation
claims by public employees. Most recently, the Supreme Court
confirmed Pickering's validity in Garcetti v.Ceballos," in which
the Court retained the essential components of the seminal case's
decision."
The Court framed the test for public employee
retaliation claims as a two-step analysis.76 The first inquiry is
whether the public employee spoke "as a citizen on a matter of
public concern,"7 7 a phrase borrowed from the original Pickering
Garcetti, however, elaborated on this first step,
analysis.7"
holding that a public employee's statements made pursuant to
his official duties are not considered speech made as citizens for
First Amendment retaliation claim purposes. 9 Therefore, if the
employee is speaking in his professional capacity or if the speech
is not a matter of public concern, the employee has no First
Amendment retaliation claim. 0 If the employee is speaking as a
citizen on a matter of public concern, however, the Court next
must move to the second step of the analysis to balance the

running an effective, efficient office. See id. at 154. The Court determined that in
Myers's case, "the balance is struck for the government." Id.
72 See id. at 143.

Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
547 U.S. 410 (2006). In Garcetti, Deputy District Attorney Richard Ceballos
alleged that, in response to a memo he wrote questioning the accuracy of an affidavit
used to secure a warrant, his government employer retaliated against him by
transferring him to another courthouse and denying him a promotion. See id. at
413-15.
5 See id. at 417-18.
76 See id. at 418.
77 Id.
71 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
71 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
soSee id. at 418.
14
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parties' interests and determine whether the government
employer was justified in treating the employee differently from
any member of the general public.8 1 Though the details of
retaliation claim analysis have changed somewhat over time, the
public concern test and the rationale of Pickering have survived
four decades of litigation and remain an essential part of First
Amendment jurisprudence.
II.

EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC CONCERN TEST

It is well-settled that Pickering and the public concern test
are applicable to public employees alleging First Amendment
retaliation claims against their government employers. 2 It is far
less certain, however, whether the public concern test applies
outside of the public employment context. Efforts have been
made throughout the country to expand the public concern test to
other situations, yet these attempts have been met with varying
degrees of success.8 3 This Part explores the circumstances in
which the public concern test might be extended to those who are
not in the employ of the government, as well as the reasons why
the Sixth Circuit was correct in refusing to apply the public
concern test to Shara Jenkins.
Expansion to CircumstancesAnalogous to the Public
Employment Context

A.

Though First Amendment retaliation claims initially arose
in cases brought by public employees, and most cases alleging
government retaliation for the exercise of free speech continue to
relate to the public employment context, 4 nongovernmental
employees are not barred from bringing such an action.85 The

81

See id.

'2

See supra Part 1.

See Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 586-87 (6th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
"' See Landstrom v. Ill. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 699 F. Supp. 1270,
1278 n.17 (N.D, Ill. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that both
parties and the court were unable to find a case in which a private individual
brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against a state actor).
" See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Although
the Pickering/Connick test arose in the context of public employment, courts have
not strictly cabined its application."); see also Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d
1211, 1217 (D. Kan. 2005) (citing Van Deelen v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 512, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (D. Kan. 2004)).
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question, then, becomes whether the public concern test should
also apply to nongovernmental employees.
Cases involving independent contractors working for the
government most closely mirror the retaliation cases brought
It was unsettled
within the public employment context."6
whether independent contractors should be treated as public
employees for the purposes of retaliation claims until the
Supreme Court's decision in Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr. 87 Umbehr entered into an agreement with the county
making him the exclusive provider of waste disposal services for
six of the county's cities. 8 While under this contract, Umbehr
was extremely outspoken at board meetings, wrote numerous
letters to local newspapers criticizing the County Commissioners,
and even ran, unsuccessfully, for election to the Board. 9 The
Board threatened to censor the local newspaper to keep it from
publishing any more of his letters and ultimately voted to
terminate its contract with Umbehr.90
Umbehr brought a retaliation claim, alleging that his
termination was motivated by his exercise of free speech
when he criticized the Board's practices. 9 1 Although Umbehr
was not a public employee, the Court held that the public
concern test should still apply, reasoning that the test
would be able to accommodate the slight differences between
Just as with
employees and independent contractors. 2
employees, the government has an interest in maintaining
efficiency, responsiveness, and in having the ability to terminate
Likewise,
independent contractors for poor performance.9 3
" See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ("The
similarities between government employees and government contractors ... are
obvious.").
17 See id. at 673-674. At the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari, there
was a split in the circuit courts over whether independent contractors were protected
by the First Amendment if they had been retaliated against for speaking on matters
of public concern. Id. at 673. The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits applied the
public concern test, while the Third and Seventh Circuits held that independent
contractors were not protected from retaliation for exercising their First Amendment
freedoms. Id.
88 See id. at 671.
9 See id.
90 See id. Umbehr, however, was able to renegotiate a similar contract with five
out of the six cities he served under the county contract. Id.
"' See id. at 671-72.
92 See id. at 678.
" See id. at 674.
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independent contractors are similar to employees in that they
" 'are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
which they work,'" and therefore, might play an important role
in debate on public issues.94 Also, the threat of losing a contract
is similar to the threat of losing one's job and is certainly enough
to "chill" an independent contractor from speaking about these
ailments, thus hindering free public debate.95 As a result of these
similarities, the Court applied the public concern test but noted
that the test should be adjusted to recognize that the
government's interests were no longer the interests of an
interests of one
employer, but rather the somewhat less weighty
96
contractor.
independent
an
hired
has
that
The Court recently reached a similar decision in Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy.97 In this
case, the Court considered whether to apply the public concern
test to a private high school football program that belonged to a
state-run athletic association.9" After entering an agreement to
abide by the association's rules-including one prohibiting the
use of "undue influence" when recruiting middle school
students-the high school's football coach sent prospects
recruiting letters containing coercive language. 99 The Court
analogized the relationship between the athletic association and
the coach with that of a government employer and a public
employee, reasoning that the association's interest in enforcing
its rules might, at times, outweigh the speech of its voluntary
participants. i0 Therefore, the Court used a standard practically
identical to the Pickering test, noting that if the "coach in this
case was 'speaking as [a] citizen[] about matters of public
concern,' [the association] can similarly impose only those

9' Id. (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511
15 See id.

U.S. 661, 674 (1994)),

11 See id. at 673.
97 551 U.S. 291 (2007).
9 See id. at 299-300.
9 See id. at 294. The letters inviting the boys to spring practice sessions urged
that "getting involved as soon as possible would definitely be to [their] advantage,"
and was signed "Your Coach." Id.
100

See id. at 299.
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conditions on such speech that are necessary to managing an
efficient and effective state-sponsored high school athletic
league. '"101
As both Umbehr and Brentwood Academy demonstrate, the
public concern test can be applied outside of the public
employment context. 112 Because the plaintiffs' positions in each
case required them to work for and represent the government
entity and to abide by its rules, the Court found that it was
appropriate to apply a test that treated the plaintiffs differently
10 3
than ordinary citizens who might enjoy much broader rights.
Accordingly, Pickering and the public concern test were expanded
to take the government's interests into account in cases in
which plaintiffs were in positions analogous to that of a public
employee.
The Failed Expansion of the Public Concern Test to Private
Individuals
The Sixth Circuit in Jenkins correctly determined that the
public concern test should not apply to Shara Jenkins or to
private citizens generally. Though it has been established that
this standard can apply outside of the public employment
context, there have been very few cases that attempted to apply
the public concern test to private individuals. These few cases
have been predominantly at the district court level, 0 with

B.

...Id. at 300 (citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411

(2006)). The Court ultimately determined that, though this was speech of public
concern, the state-run association's interest in ending "hard-sell," exploitative tactics
directed at children outweighed the coach's interest in using such methods. See id.

Therefore, "the First Amendment does not excuse Brentwood from abiding by the
same anti-recruiting rule that governs" other voluntary participants in the athletic
association. Id.
"02Pickering and the public concern test have also been applied to
nongovernment employees in other situations. See, e.g., Smith v. Cleburne County
Hosp., 870 F.2d 1375, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989)
(applying the public concern test to a doctor seeking medical-staff privileges at a

public hospital); Forras v. Andros, 470 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing the public concern test as applied to a volunteer firefighter retaliated
against for criticizing working conditions at Ground Zero after the September 11th
terrorist attacks).
103 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675-76; see also
Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. at 299-300.
104 See, e.g., Mnyofu v. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-C-8717, 2005 WL 2978735, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2005) (applying the public concern test to students' parents who
had no other connection to the public school); Clark v. W. Contra Costa Unified Sch.
Dist., No. C-98-4884-RB, 2000 WL 336382, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000) (same).
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limited support in the circuit courts. 0 5 The fatal flaw in the
district court decisions is their use of Pickering's rationale, which
is specific to the public employment context, to support an
extension of the public concern test to private individuals.
Given the fundamental differences between private
individuals and public employees, Pickering and the public
concern test should not be applied to private citizens for a
number of reasons. First, the government does not have as great
an interest in controlling private citizen speech as it does in
controlling the speech of public employees since private citizens'
speech will have a far less direct and substantial effect on the
government's ability to maintain an efficient office. The aim in
Pickering was to balance employees' rights with the "interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
1 6 Thus, this
public services it performs through its employees.""
rationale should not apply to private individuals who will have
little effect on how the government performs its public services.
Second, the public concern test is not needed in order to
permit private individuals to speak. As will be discussed, private
citizens enjoy broader constitutional rights than public
employees.' ° The public concern test was established to expand
the rights of employees who were thought to have surrendered
fundamental rights upon accepting government employment, not
to restrict the essentially unburdened fundamental rights of
private citizens. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Jenkins, "It]he
public concern test was meant to form a sphere of protected
activity for public employees, not a constraining noose around the
speech of private citizens." '
Lastly, private citizens do not share any of the
characteristics of independent contractors that justified an
extension of the public concern test to the latter group. As
discussed above, the only reason courts have seen it fit to apply
the public concern test to independent contractors is that they
are in relationships with the government analogous to the public
"o'But see Landstrom v. Ill. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670,
679-80 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming the lower court's decision to apply the public
concern test to private individuals).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
lO7See infra Part III.
108 Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 586 n.1 (quoting Van
Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct.

2445 (2008).
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employment context. °9 As private citizens have not entered into
any contractual agreements with the government, the rationale
in cases like Umbehr and Brentwood Academy should not apply
to private citizens any more so than the rationale in Pickering.
Accordingly, the Jenkins Court properly found that as a
private citizen, Shara Jenkins should not be subject to the public
concern test when analyzing her First Amendment retaliation
claim.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
While the Sixth Circuit in Jenkins correctly held that the
public concern test does not apply to private individuals,1 1 ° it
failed to adequately address Rock Hill's policy concerns in coming
to its decision. Rock Hill argued that, by failing to apply the
public concern test to private individuals, the court would open
the floodgates of federal litigation.111 This Part examines Rock
Hill's contention further, discussing the overly liberal standard
adopted by the court due to its inattention to policy, as well as its
failure to properly apply alternatives to the public concern test in
order to limit litigation. Had the Sixth Circuit demanded a more
stringent causal connection or an opportunity for the defendant
to prove that it would have taken the same action regardless of
the plaintiffs speech, the court could have adopted a standard
that succeeded in reducing the potential for excessive litigation
while remaining consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
A.

PotentialProblems

Rock Hill expressed valid concerns regarding the potential
for excessive federal litigation, and its position is by no means
frivolous or unprecedented. Similar concerns were expressed by
district courts in Landstrom v. Illinois Department of Child &
Family Services"12 and Clark v. West Contra Costa Unified School
District,"3 both of which adopted the public concern test for
private individuals.

103
1lO

See supra Part II.A.
See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 587.

.. See Final Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 17-18, id., 2007 WL 4266667.
11"699 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. I1. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990).
1IJ No. C-98-4884-CRB, 2000 WL 336382, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000).
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The decision to utilize the public concern test in these cases
was not merely a misapplication of the public concern test, nor a
display of the district courts' ignorance regarding Pickering's
rationale. Rather, it was a deliberate choice made to limit
potentially excessive retaliation claim litigation in the federal
courts. Prior to Landstrom, retaliation claims were reserved for
public employees and those in analogous relationships with the
government, despite there being no express limitation to these
types of relationships.1 14 As a result, it was a legitimate concern
that federal courts could be overwhelmed by litigation caused by
Landstrom's holding, which allowed retaliation claims to be
brought by private citizens for the first time and effectively
created a new cause of action.
Another reason for the Landstrom and Clark Courts'
decisions to adopt a limiting principle to reduce litigation is the
expansive definition of free speech and free expression under the
First Amendment. The wide range of speech protected by the
First Amendment is especially relevant when considered in
relation to the first element of a retaliation claim: that the
plaintiff must engage in constitutionally protected activity.1 15
The Clark Court noted that "nearly all activity is expressive
conduct of some kind ...""' Likewise, nearly all speech is
free speech, as observed by the Sixth Circuit in Jenkins.11
Speech is generally constitutionally protected, and only a limited
number of categories of speech may fall outside the bounds
of the Constitution's protection." 8 These categories include
defamation, 9 obscenity, 120 and "fighting words,"'' and are not
likely to overlap with retaliation cases to the point of providing

.14See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1995).
15 See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 585.
116 Clark, 2000 WL 336382, at *9.
117See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588.
§

See id.
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,

753-55(1985).
15, 23 (1973)
1211See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.

("This much has been

categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment.").
1

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("[F]ighting words-'those

personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction'-are
generally proscribable under the First Amendment." (quoting Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))).
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an effective limitation on the amount of litigation produced by
rejecting the public concern test for private citizens. As a result,
the Clark Court reasoned that failure to adopt some limiting
principle "would permit any individual who does not work for the
government to bring a federal suit whenever a state actor
mistreats him or her as a result of any speech or expressive
conduct. ' 12 2 Absent some limitation, the sheer number of
potential private citizen suits could disrupt the efficient and
effective management of government to the same extent as public
employee speech since "[ejvery discretionary decision made by
official or actor would give rise to a federal cause
any government
123
action.
of
B.

The Need for a Limiting Principle

Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a
limiting principle should be employed to reduce the potential for
excessive First Amendment retaliation suits by private citizens,
the Court previously recognized this need in other contexts. For
example, in Wilkie v. Robbins,124 a private landowner Robbins
attempted to assert a retaliation claim against government
actors, arguing that they retaliated against him because of his
refusal to grant the government an easement over his property. 125
In considering whether to allow this cause of action, the Court
noted that Robbins's claim did not exactly resemble First
Amendment retaliation claims of public employees.126 On one
hand, public employee retaliation claims are limited by the
courts' use of the public concern test and their consideration of
proof tending to show that the government action was justified
on other grounds. 127 Contrarily, there is no limiting principle in
an "action to redress retaliation against those who resist

122Clark v. W. Contra Costa Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-98-4884-CRB, 2000 WL
336382, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000).
123

Id.

124551 U.S. 537 (2007).
125 See id. at 545. Robbins claimed that his Fifth Amendment constitutional
"right to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse any grant of a
property interest without compensation" had been violated. Id. at 548. The right
asserted by Robbins is guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, which states, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.

CONST. amend. V.
12 See Robbins, 551 U.S. at 555-56.
127 See id.at 558 n.10.
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Government impositions on their property rights. 128 This led the
Court to fear that allowing such an unrestricted cause of action
"would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental
action affecting property interests. 12 9
Whereas a limiting principle is already incorporated into
public employees' First Amendment retaliation claims through
the use of the public concern test and the government's ability to
demonstrate that it had independent grounds for its allegedly
retaliatory behavior, no such limit was placed on the Fifth
As a
Amendment retaliation claim brought by Robbins.
result, the Court found that any private citizen would be able to
bring such a claim, leading to an "enormous swath of potential
13
Though the potential for excessive litigation does
litigation.""
not necessarily demand that a cause of action be rejected,"' the
Court grounded its decision to deny Robbins's claim on the likely
to "the
inundation of federal courts with similar claims due
132
elusiveness of a limiting principle for Robbins's claim.
By analogy, a similar argument can be made for First
Amendment retaliation claims brought by private individuals.
As determined above, the public concern test should not be
applied to private citizens, thus eliminating one of the limiting
principles cited by the Robbins Court. Because of the similarity
between First and Fifth Amendment retaliation claims with
regard to their lack of a well-defined limiting principle, and given
the Supreme Court's holding in Robbins, it is likely that the
Court would recognize the need for a limiting principle to reduce
the potentially "enormous swath" of litigation brought by private
1 33
individuals in First Amendment retaliation claims as well.
The Third Element as an Alternative Limiting Principle

C.

Though policy precludes the Jenkins Court from adopting
the public concern test as its limiting principle, there are other
means available to reduce the amount of litigation that may arise
In fact, the
out of private citizens' retaliation suits.
Sixth Circuit briefly touched on one of these methods. The
Id. at 561.
Id.
"0 Id.

12

129

132

See id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 561 n.ll (majority opinion).

1"

Id. at 561.

1

1
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Jenkins Court determined-in hurriedly disregarding Rock Hill's
policy arguments-that the third element of a retaliation claim
could sufficiently prevent disputes between individuals and
government
actors from frequently becoming First Amendment
13 4
lawsuits.
As articulated and applied in Jenkins, however, the
remaining elements of a retaliation claim are not an effective
safeguard against an inundation of the federal courts with
private citizen suits.13 5 According to Jenkins, the third element
of a retaliation claim requires that the adverse action by the
government be "motivated at least in part as a response to the
exercise of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.""' 6 The Jenkins
Court of appeals seemed to suggest that application of this
element would limit the amount of cases that could be brought by
private individuals by weeding out the claims that lacked a
sufficient causal connection between the plaintiffs speech and
the defendant's action.13 7
While sound in theory, it is hard to see how the language of
the third element could possibly succeed in reducing litigation.
As articulated by Jenkins, the third element requires a finding of
such a minimal causal connection that it destroys any chance of
effectively limiting litigation by private individuals.
This
element requires merely that the adverse action be motivated "at
least in part" by the individual's exercise of a constitutionally
13
protected activity.
This minimal causal standard is both ineffective and
unsupported by precedent. The Supreme Court announced the
standard to be used when examining causation in government
retaliation claims in an earlier case, Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle. 39
There, Doyle, the
plaintiff, argued that he was dismissed from his teaching position
in the Mt. Healthy School District for exercising his First
Amendment rights by criticizing his school on the radio.14 ° The
"' Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist. 513 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
"' See id.
6 Id. at 586 (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
...See id. at 588.

Id. at 586 (quoting Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678) (emphasis added).
U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
140 See id. at 282-83. The decision to fire Doyle was made about one month after
his call to the radio station. Id. at 282. He had, however, also been recently involved
':

139 429
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Supreme Court agreed with the court below in that this
constitutionally protected "conduct was a 'substantial factor' or to
put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor'" in the
school's decision to fire Doyle.14 1
The "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" test for
retaliation claims has continued to be the applicable standard
used by the Supreme Court in First Amendment retaliation suits.
In Board of Education v. Pico, the Supreme Court elaborated on
'
There, the Court noted
the meaning of "substantial factor."142
that the substantial factor standard requires a significant causal
connection between the constitutionally protected activity and
the government's adverse action.1 43 Moreover, the protected
conduct must be so decisive that, in its absence, the government
would have taken the opposite action.1 44 The need for finding
this significant causal connection in retaliation cases was
reemphasized in Umbehr. There, the Court found that the
individual must engage in constitutionally protected conduct
that ultimately becomes a "substantial or motivating factor"
Following the
in the government's decision to retaliate.14
Supreme Court's lead, the Sixth Circuit has also adopted the
substantial or motivating factor standard for the third element
of retaliation claims, focusing on whether the government
part by the individual's
action was motivated in substantial
146
constitutionally protected conduct.
In the face of this precedent, the Jenkins Court's choice to
use the phrase "at least in part," rather than "substantial" or
"motivating factor," when describing the causal link between the
first and second elements is not merely a matter of semantics. In
spite of the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit's adoption of
the substantial or motivating factor standard, the Jenkins Court
deliberately chose a less stringent causal standard in an attempt
to make it easier for private citizen plaintiffs to bring First

in an altercation with another teacher, referred to students as "sons of bitches," and
made an obscene gesture to two female students for their failure to obey his
directions. Id. at 281-82.
"' Id. at 287. The case was remanded to examine whether the school district
would have taken the same action absent Doyle's criticism on the radio. See id.
142 457 U.S. 853, 871 n.22 (1982).
14' See id.
144 See id.
115

14

Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
See Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Amendment retaliation claims. 14 7 In announcing its version of
the elements of a retaliation claim, the Jenkins Court cites to a
previous Sixth Circuit case, Bloch v. Ribar.145 Though Bloch does
utilize the "at least in part" standard for causation, it does not
cite any supporting cases from which this minimal causal
standard originated.149 Rather, the Bloch Court attempted to
support its decision to use the "at least in part" language by
citing Mt. Healthy,15 ° which in fact requires a more significant
of
one
is
actually
and
connection,
causal
the earliest cases to use the substantial or motivating factor
standard.151

The decision to use a minimal causal standard cannot be
justified as a method by which the Bloch Court intended to make
it easier for private plaintiffs to bring retaliation claims; quite
the opposite, as the Bloch Court did not discuss this, or any
other, policy in making its decision. Instead, the Bloch Court
supported its decision by analogizing its case to another private
citizen retaliation suit-one in which the substantial or
motivating factor test was used.152 Due to the fact that Bloch
cites only cases that use the substantial or motivating factor
standard and that it fails to name any policy reasons for its
change to a less stringent causal standard, the Sixth Circuit
recognized the need to clarify the standard in Mattox v. City of
Forest Park.53 There, the court reiterated the elements of a
retaliation claim under Bloch, including the minimal causal
connection but subsequently noted that the real "issue is whether
the adverse action taken against plaintiffs by defendants was

...See Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist. 513 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
"4 Id. at 585-86.
149 Bloch v.
1,oSee id.

Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998).

See supra text accompanying notes 139-141.

See Bloch, 156 F.3d at 680-81 (citing Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246,
260-63 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998)). In Barrett, the plaintiff
was a private citizen who had a judgment rendered against him by Judge
Harrington. See Barett, 130 F.3d at 249. Barrett openly criticized the judge and
began "investigating" her, leading to her retaliating against him by telling the media
that he was stalking her. See id. at 263. The court used a standard that called for
the finder of fact to determine "whether the action taken was because he engaged in
the ... protected conduct[, which] must be a 'substantial factor' or a 'motivating
factor' "in the government's decision to act. Id. at 262.
"" 183 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 1999).
1
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motivated in substantial part by the protected activity of the
plaintiffs.' 5 4
The Jenkins Court should have used the substantial or
motivating factor standard espoused by the Supreme Court and a
great deal of circuit court cases. If it had, it would have been
possible to adopt a limiting principle which remained consistent
with precedent, while simultaneously taking Rock Hill's policy
considerations into account.
D. Independent Reasons for the "Retaliatory"Action
The defendant's ability to prove that he would have taken
the same action absent the plaintiffs exercise of his
constitutional rights is an additional limiting principle that the
Jenkins court failed to properly apply. Use of this limiting
principle is supported by Mt. Healthy, in which the Supreme
Court considered alternative reasons for the defendant's action in
addition to its consideration of the three traditional elements of a
retaliation claim. 155 There, the Court reasoned that the court
below should have determined whether the defendant school
board "would have reached the same decision... even in the
absence of the protected conduct."' 56 Supreme Court precedent
also shows that the government actor's malice or spite does not
157
necessarily render his actions unconstitutionally retaliatory.
As long as there are valid, independent grounds for the
defendant's actions, a 158plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation
claim may be defeated.
Though the Court has noted that this approach has been
taken because any alternative "approach would have frustrated
an employer's legitimate interest in securing a competent
'
it is illogical to limit the defendant's ability to
workforce, 159
prove independent grounds for his actions solely to public
employment cases. First, it is a limiting principle that could
successfully eliminate claims of private individuals in which the
government is acting with a legitimate, constitutional purpose.

151

Id. at 520-21 (emphasis added).

15 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87

(1977).
Id. at 287.
1,7See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 558 n.10 (2007).
"

See id.
19 Id.
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Second, like the third element of retaliation claims--which is
clearly applicable to private citizen suits-allowing the defendant
to demonstrate an independent purpose also allows him to
demonstrate that the plaintiffs speech was not the substantial or
motivating factor for his decision to act.
While the Jenkins Court mentions the possibility of a
defendant having an independent reason for taking the allegedly
retaliatory action in the abstract,"' it does not consider this
possibility when applying the law to Jenkins's particular case.
Rather, after holding that Jenkins satisfied all of the elements of
a retaliation claim, the court concluded that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants.1"'
According to its own explanation of the law, however, Rock Hill
would have rightfully been entitled to summary judgment if it
took the same actions regardless of Jenkins's exercise of free
speech.162
Even viewing the facts in favor of the plaintiff, it is
impossible to get around the fact that Jenkins illogically made
demands that Rock Hill staff administer Shanell's medicine
because she no longer wanted to go to the the School to
administer it herself, while simultaneously refusing to sign the
medical forms required to authorize the School to take the
demanded action. 16 3 Also, once called, Child Services conducted
its own, four-month-long investigation, and brought its own case
against Jenkins for medical neglect."6 4 In light of these facts, the
Sixth Circuit should have at least considered whether Rock Hill
had independent grounds for contacting Child Services-namely,
protecting Shanell's welfare-before determining that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment.
The Jenkins Court should have considered whether Rock Hill
was able to demonstrate an independent reason for calling Child
Services. Had it done so, it would have stayed true to its own
160 See Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2445 (2008).
161 See id. at 588-89.
162 See id. at 586 ("[I]f

the defendant can show he would have taken the same

action in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to summary
judgment.").
161 See Jenkins v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affd
in part, revd in part sub nom. Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580

(6th Cir. 2008).

164 See id. at 751.
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articulation of the law of First Amendment retaliation claims,
while simultaneously adopting a second limiting principle to
eliminate claims in which the government has a legitimate,
constitutional purpose for acting.
CONCLUSION

Though retaliation claims originated and are most commonly
brought within the public employment context, private citizens
The law
are also permitted to bring this cause of action."
governing these two types of retaliation claims, however, is not
identical. While public employees' speech must relate to a matter
of public concern to be protected, no such limitation exists for
retaliation claims brought by private individuals.16 6 As a result,
as the retaliation claim becomes more and more popular amongst
private individuals, there is a legitimate policy concern that such
an unrestricted cause of action could result in the federal courts
being inundated with First Amendment retaliation claims
brought by private citizens.
The Sixth Circuit in Jenkins rightfully concluded that the
public concern test does not apply to private individuals but too
hastily disregarded the policy concerns which result from its
rejection of the test. The Jenkins Court should have addressed
these concerns by applying limiting principles to help curb the
potential litigation that could come from private citizen
retaliation suits, such as the use of a more stringent causal
standard, and by allowing the defendant to prove independent
grounds for his allegedly retaliatory actions, both of which are
supported by Supreme Court precedent. By failing to properly
apply either of these limiting principles and by failing to
acknowledge the policy considerations associated with its
holding, the Jenkins Court improvidently held that the district
court erred in its grant of summary judgment to Rock Hill.

165
66

See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 583, 585.
See id. at 587-88.

